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Abstract

When black and white Americans want the president to do different things, who wins?
When low income earners prefer different government action than do middle and high income
earners, whose preferences are reflected in presidential behavior? Recent studies show that
congressional behavior often most closely follows the preferences of the white and the wealthy,
but we know relatively little about presidential behavior. Since the president and Congress make
policy together, it is important to understand the extent of political equality in presidential
behavior. We examine the degree to which presidents have provided equal representation to
these groups over the past four decades. We compare the preferences of these groups for federal
spending in various budget domains to presidents’ subsequent budget proposals in those domains
from 1974 to 2010. Over this period, presidents’ proposals aligned more with the preferences of
whites and high income earners. However, Republican presidents are driving this overall

pattern. Democratic presidents represent racial and income groups equally, but Republicans’
proposals are much more consistent with the spending preferences of whites and high income
earners. This pattern of representation reflects the composition of the president’s party coalition
and the spending preferences of groups within the party coalition.
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Who gets what they want from government? That is, whose preferences for government
policy are best reflected in the policies government creates? Sidney Verba (2003, 663) argued
“the equal consideration of the preferences and interests of all citizens” is “one of the bedrock
principles in a democracy.” Yet, several recent studies of U.S. politics find that the wealthy and
whites are more likely than the poor and racial/ethnic minorities to see their preferences reflected
in government behavior and policy (e.g., Jacobs and Page 2005; Bartels 2008; Griffin and
Newman 2008; Ellis 2012; Flavin 2012; Gilens 2012; Gilens and Page 2014). Additional works
qualify, critique, and complicate these studies (e.g., Soroka and Wlezien 2008; Bhatti and
Erikson 2011), finding that the degree of inequality in political outcomes varies across political
contexts (e.g., Rigby and Wright 2011, 2013; Ellis 2013; Brunner, Ross, and Washington 2013;
Flavin 2015), though few have argued that the American political system reflects the preferences
of various income and racial groups equally. The vast majority of this literature examines the
content of public policy or congressional behavior. We know much less about presidential
representation of income and racial/ethnic groups. Although presidency scholars have made
major strides in understanding when and how much presidential behavior mirrors public
preferences (e.g., Cohen 1997; Erikson et al. 2002, Canes-Wrone and Shotts 2004; Rottinghaus
2006; Druckman and Jacobs 2011), according to Druckman and Jacobs (2009), we have just
begun to appreciate which groups’ preferences presidents represent best.
In this study, we seek a more complete understanding of whose preferences are best
represented in presidential behavior. In doing so, we build on and contribute to a growing
literature that examines inequality in political representation more broadly (e.g., Enns and
Wlezien 2011). It is not a foregone conclusion that the patterns of inequality seen elsewhere in
the American political system would also characterize the presidency. The president serves as a
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national leader, rather a representative of a smaller, sometimes more homogeneous, constituency
like members of Congress (Baker 2008), which can generate different incentives to represent
specific groups. Moreover, presidential and congressional representation may differ given
institutional differences in method of election, term length, term limits, and citizens' different
expectations of these elected officials. For example, legislators who are retiring, thus free from
electoral pressures to represent their constituents’ preferences, behave differently than legislators
running for reelection (e.g. Rothenberg and Sanders 2007). Since second-term presidents spend
half their tenure in office without the possibility of reelection, unlike the vast majority of
members of Congress, presidential behavior may differ from congressional behavior. If so,
minority representation may vary significantly across the branches of government.
In the particular policy arena we study here, presidents’ proposals for federal government
spending, the president and members of Congress may often have different incentives for
representation. Presumably, the public holds the President more accountable than members of
Congress for the composition of the budget simply because the president proposes an entire
budget. Members of Congress can request additional spending on areas of particular ideological
or economic interest to their constituents, but members do not propose entire budgets, meaning
they can often make requests without the hard choices the president must make: a dollar increase
in one program means a dollar decrease in another or the president must bear the political cost of
a bloated budget.
Moreover, it is important to examine equality of representation in the context of the
presidency because the president plays the strongest and most direct role in representing citizens’
preferences of any single actor in the American political system. A Member of Congress may
represent her constituents well or poorly, but in the end, she is but one of 435 or 100 members in
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a single chamber of a bicameral institution that comprises one of three branches of government.
A constituent may be especially well represented by her member of the House, but that member
has limited influence on the outputs of the House, much less the ultimate output of the
policymaking process involving the House, Senate, and president. Thus, a connection between
public preferences and policy outputs is important (Gilens 2012), but does not tell us much about
the behavior of any specific individuals. In contrast, the president is a single actor who can often
take direct action (Howell 2003). Of course, the president often relies heavily on others in the
administration, but within the executive branch, the president’s opinion is decisive, unlike
individual lawmakers’. Thus, within the American system, the president has the most power to
expand, shrink, or even reverse the patterns of unequal congressional representation.
Consequently, the presidency should be of great significance to representation scholars.
We examine the degree to which presidents have provided equal representation to racial
groups (blacks and whites—unfortunately our data source did not identify Latinos for most of
our period of study) and to income groups (low, middle, and high income earners) over the past
four decades. We observe whether these groups prefer government spending to increase,
decrease, or remain about the same. We then compare group preferences to presidents’
subsequent budget proposals to see whether presidential behavior matches group preferences.
Doing so enables us to see, for example, how often presidents propose a spending increase in a
domain when a group prefers more spending in that policy area. Analyzing data from 1974 to
2010, we find that presidents’ proposals match whites’ and high income earners’ preferences
significantly more often than the preferences of African-Americans and low income earners. In
particular, Republican presidents’ proposals are more often congruent with the spending
preferences of whites and the wealthy. Democrats, on the other hand, tend to match the groups’
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preferences equally. This pattern of presidential representation reflects the composition of
current party coalitions. That is, presidents act most consistently with the preferences of the
largest groups in their party coalitions, leading to different patterns of representation for
Democrats and Republicans.
BACKGROUND
By political representation, we mean the relationship between what citizens want
government actors to do and what they actually do. This connection between the governed and
their governors is fundamental to democratic theory. Studies of political representation have
analyzed the connection between mass public preferences as a whole and some government
action, be it a roll call vote, government spending, or a general course of policy making (e.g.,
Page and Shapiro 1983; Erikson, et al. 2002; Wlezien 2004). Examining undifferentiated mass
preferences has both strategic and normative appeal (Downs 1954). Most presidential
representation studies follow suit in examining presidential responsiveness to majority opinion
(e.g., Cohen 1997, 2015; Canes-Wrone and Shotts 2004; Druckman, Jacobs, and Ostermeier
2004; Rottinghaus 2006).
But, in one important respect focusing on majority representation is too simplistic. While
the public often exhibits a surprising level of agreement on policy matters, it is made up of
identifiable, politically-relevant groups that sometimes disagree, a fact presidents must confront
when crafting strategies to maintain or build the coalition needed to win elections or advance
policy goals (Bishin 2009; Druckman and Jacobs 2011). Sometimes policy makers simply
cannot please the whole public because the public is sharply divided. In such instances, with
whom do presidents side? Scholars are just beginning to understand the conditions under which
presidents respond to the policy preferences of subgroups in the public (see Druckman and
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Jacobs 2009) and most of the work so far has focused on representation of the president’s
partisans (e.g., Wood 2009; Eshbaugh-Soha and Rottinghaus 2013). Although we have learned
much about the nature and extent of minority representation in Congress (e.g., Canon 1999;
Griffin and Newman 2008; Bishin 2009; Minta 2011; Grose 2011; Hero and Preuhs 2013; Butler
2014), if we are to understand minority representation in the United States, with its system of
separated powers, we must examine presidents’ representation of subgroups.
Based on existing research, we expect that presidents will tend to side with those who
will help them advance policy and electoral goals (Fiorina 1974; Wood 2009; Griffin and
Newman 2013). The president’s party coalition is an obvious source of such help. It will come
as no surprise to students of American politics that the major parties’ composition differs in
terms of race and income. The General Social Survey (GSS) data we employ show that during
the period of study (1974-2010), on average 19% of all Democrats were African-American,
while only 3% of Republicans were African-American.1 Clearly, Democrats have greater
incentive to pay heed to blacks’ preferences. Income differences between the parties, though not
quite as sharp, are significant as well. Splitting the public into three roughly equally sized
groups based on income, on average, 40% of the identifiers with each of parties were middle
income earners, while 32% of Democrats were low income earners and 28% were high income
earners. In contrast, 23% of Republicans were low income earners, while 38% earned high
incomes. The Democrats’ coalition is more balanced; the difference in the percent of high and
low income earners is only 4 points, compared to 15 points for Republicans. Thus, Democrats
have incentives to please both high and low income earners. In contrast, Republicans have
greater incentive to respond to high income earners than low income earners when their views

1

These tabulations include partisan leaners. We first obtained the relevant percentage from each survey
and then calculated the mean of these percentages.
6

conflict.2 Consequently, we expect Democrats to represent racial and income groups fairly
equally while Republican presidents will favor whites and the wealthy.
DATA AND METHODS
Assessing the degree of presidential policy representation various groups enjoy requires a
measure of each group’s policy preferences and corresponding presidential behavior. We follow
Canes-Wrone and Shotts’ (2004) approach of comparing public preferences for federal
government spending in various issue domains to presidents’ annual budget proposals. We drew
preference measures from the GSS, which regularly asks whether “we’re spending too much
money,” “too little money,” or “about the right amount” on 11 different policy areas to the
president’s annual budgetary proposal in each of these domains (crime, defense, education, the
environment, foreign aid, ground transportation, health care, parks and recreation, space
exploration, welfare, and aid to big cities).
The GSS measured spending preferences in 26 years from 1974 to 2010 (almost every
year from 1974 to 1994 and every even-numbered year since). These preference measures match
up nicely with many of the “functions” defined in the federal budget, enabling us to observe
whether the public’s preference for increased spending on the environment, for example, was
followed by a presidential proposal for more spending on the environment (Wlezien 2004; see
Appendix for details about which spending items were matched with which budget functions).
We compare preference measures in a given year to the president’s next budgetary proposal,
meaning preferences are measured prior to presidential behavior.3 The unit of analysis is a
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Druckman and Jacobs (2011) provide additional support for this expectation, showing that Ronald
Reagan was especially attentive to the preferences of high income earners.
3
Until 2006 the GSS is typically in the field sometime between January and March. Since 2006 the
survey was fielded typically March to August. We compared GSS items in a given year (e.g., 1974) to the
president’s proposal for the following fiscal year (FY1976), which the administration would have
compiled in the fall of 1974 and presented to Congress in February 1975. Following Canes-Wrone and
7

particular domain in a particular year. Matching spending measures in the 26 years to budgetary
proposals yields a total of 270 observations (the GSS did not include every spending item in
every study).4 As is typical in studies of unequal representation based on income, we created
three income groups of roughly equal size based on the distribution of respondent incomes in
each survey (Bartels 2008). The GSS did not include measures allowing us to identify Latinos
for much of the time period, so in analyses of racial groups we only examine respondents
identifying as white or African-American.
The general approach of comparing spending preferences with presidents’ budgetary
proposals has several attractions (Canes-Wrone and Shotts 2004). The president submits a
budget proposal to Congress every year. The president’s budget proposal includes spending
proposals for virtually all aspects of the federal government. Examining budget proposals
therefore provides a consistent and frequent measure of policy representation across a wide range
of issue domains.
Perhaps more importantly, the budgetary process requires the president to take a range of
policy positions every year. Apart from budget proposals, presidents are rarely required to take
policy positions publicly. Typically, they can choose whether and when to make a statement
about their position on any issue. A President has incentives to take public stands on issues
where the president’s position is popular and to avoid making unpopular positions public
(Groseclose and McCarty 2001). As a result, if we only examine voluntary presidential issue

Shotts (2004), we compared the “estimate” for budgetary authority in a given fiscal year to the “estimate”
for budgetary authority the previous fiscal year, or the figures the administration would have used as it
prepared the next year’s proposal.
4

The budgets for FYs 1978, 1984 and 1985 only report by function, while many of our categories require
more specific figures (broken down by subfunctions). Following Canes-Wrone and Shotts (2004, 691,
note 4), we excluded the domains where we required more specific figures.
8

positions it may be difficult to observe some instances in which the president is out of step with
public preferences simply because presidents may not advertise their unpopular positions when
this is avoidable. In addition, GSS spending items are strong measures of public preferences.
The public’s spending preferences react in quite sensible ways to real world events and changes
in policy (Wlezien 1995) and citizens appear to have distinct preferences across domains rather
than merely “global” spending preferences (Jacoby 1994; Wlezien 2004).5 In short, our
approach focuses on substantive representation in an important arena (allocating government
resources) that covers a variety of issue domains in a legal context that requires presidents to
make proposals annually. This setup provides a consistent set of data over a relatively long
period of time with the analytical advantage of required, rather than voluntary, proposals from
the president.
Although our approach has its advantages, we recognize that it is but one way to study
representation, which is a rich and complex phenomenon (e.g., Pitken 1967; Canon 1999; Tate
2003; Conley 2005). For example, our approach does not reflect all of the many symbolic
elements of presidential representation (e.g., Pitken 1967; Waterman, et al. 1999). Consider the
importance of Obama’s statement just after Trayvon Martin’s death, “if I had a son, he’d look
like Trayvon” or leaving an empty chair next to Michelle Obama during his last State of the
Union address to signify victims of gun violence. Our approach misses these important symbolic
dimensions of representation.6 Nevertheless, as House Speaker, John Boehner, argued “the

As Wlezien and Soroka (2011) point out, question wording can affect respondents’ stated spending
preferences. As such, we may over- or under-estimate the true degree to which policy responds to
preferences at large. This is an important concern. However, to affect our conclusions about group
disparities, wording effects would have to differ across racial groups. We are unaware of any literature
that finds differential wording effects across groups.
6
Moreover, the policy domains cover a number of programs so the president could propose a cut in
welfare spending overall, but propose an increase in grants to minority businesses (we thank an
anonymous reviewer for noting this). We also recognize that spending is not the only dimension of
5
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budget is an opportunity to lay out your priorities,” and since much of government’s impact on
people’s lives stems from the ways it spends money, the president’s budget is an important piece
of government action.”7
In addition, it is important to note that budgetary proposals may sometimes be strategic
(Kiewiet and McCubbins 1985). For example, in theory the president may prefer only modest
increases in education funding, but initially ask for a large increase to stake out a bargaining
position. Despite this possibility, presidents face strong incentives to propose sincere budget
requests. Kiewiet and McCubbins (1988) contend that under many circumstances, presidential
misrepresentation of preferences leads to a less preferred outcome than sincere representation of
preferences. In addition, they argue that voters are likely to sanction presidents who are not
sincere, which presidents anticipate when formulating their proposals. Moreover, a number of
studies treat budget proposals as non-strategic (Kiewiet and MCCubbins 1988; Canes-Wrone
2001; Canes-Wrone and Shotts 2004). Finally, we note that our measure of policy representation
and research design do not enable us to make direct causal claims that citizens influenced
presidential behavior. We can only measure congruence between preferences and presidential
behavior and see whether the degree of congruence varies across groups.
We adopt two specific approaches within the general framework of comparing spending
preferences to spending proposals. First, we classify each case as an instance of congruence or
non-congruence for each group. Group preferences and presidential proposals are congruent if 1)

policy. In criminal justice, for example, individual citizens may care as much or more about the laxness
or severity of sentencing policy than they do about the amount spent. Likewise, the amount spent may be
less important than how that money is spent (e.g., for prisons or rehabilitation). Thus, we analyze just one
dimension of policy responsiveness.
7

See http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/15/us/politics/boehner-says-election-losses-wont-deter-push-forsmaller-government.html?_r=0).
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a group prefers more spending and the president’s proposal is at least 2% more than the previous
year’s spending, adjusting for inflation, 2) a group prefers about the same amount of spending
and the president’s proposal is between 2% less and 2% more than the previous year, adjusting
for inflation, and 3) a group prefers less spending and the president’s proposal is at least 2% less
than the previous year, adjusting for inflation.8 When using this approach, we measure group
preference as the category (prefer more, less, or about the same amount of spending) with the
most respondents. Thus, if 25% prefer more spending, 35% prefer less spending, and 40% prefer
about the same amount, the group’s preference is for the same amount of spending.9 CanesWrone and Shotts (2004) employ this approach, though we modified their method slightly.10
Replicating their approach with our data from slightly different years finds very similar results
(see Appendix).
Under this first measure of policy congruence, 33% of presidential proposals were
congruent with public preferences taken as whole. The relatively low percentage of congruence
stems largely from the public’s penchant to prefer spending increases (e.g., Jacoby 1994). The
public as a whole preferred spending increases in 50% of cases, while presidents proposed
spending increases in only 37% of cases. Despite limited levels of congruence under this
definition, we find patterns of representation that square nicely with previous studies. For
We tested the results’ sensitivity to several thresholds and found that the data support our conclusions
across a variety of thresholds.
8

9

In three cases, an equal percentage preferred less/more spending and the same amount of spending. In
these cases, we coded the group’s preference as preferring the same amount of spending.
10

They ignored the possibility of preferring the same amount of spending, classifying each budget
proposal as either an increase or decrease in spending. We opted to take advantage of all the information
the spending items provide, including instances where the most preferred option was the same amount of
spending (26% of cases). In addition, 13% of proposals involved changes of less than 2% over the
previous year. We thought it best to consider these cases as congruent with a preference for the same
amount of spending. Including this additional type of congruence allows us to take into account the status
quo bias in the system (Gilens 2012).
11

instance, Gilens (2012) found considerably less government responsiveness in social welfare and
economic policy domains (the domains we examine) compared to religious or moral issues.
Moreover, various studies have found greater representation in domains with greater salience
(e.g., Page and Shapiro 1983; Wlezien 2004; Lax and Phillips 2009). We find higher levels of
congruence on issues generally considered more salient than on less salient issues (e.g., we found
58% congruence on health care, 54% on welfare, and 46% on education, but just 6% congruence
for parks and recreation and 0% for ground transportation).
It is important to appreciate that when groups prefer the same action, presidents will
inevitably represent those groups equally. Presidents can only represent groups unequally when
the groups want different things (Ura and Ellis 2008; Soroka and Wlezien 2008). We first
examine the overall degree of presidential representation of each group. Then, to assess whether
presidential proposals represents some groups more than others, we examine instances in which
the groups prefer different action (e.g., one group prefers a spending increase while another
prefers a decrease).
Note that this first measure of preferences treats as equivalent a case where a group is
almost equally split and one in which a large majority prefers one category to another. For
example, if 34% of a group prefers a spending increase, 33% a decrease, and 33% the same
amount of spending, the measure codes the group as wanting more spending. The measure codes
identically a case where 60% of a group prefers a spending increase, 25% prefers the same
spending, and only 15% prefers less spending even though the distribution of preferences differ
dramatically. Therefore, our second measure of group preferences calculates the difference
between the percentage of the group that prefers more spending and the percentage preferring
less spending (see Wlezien 2004; Soroka and Wlezien 2011). By this measure, the first
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hypothetical case described above would be coded as 1 (a narrow preference for an increase),
while the second would be coded 45 (a broad preference for an increase). The two
complementary preference measures we employ point to the same conclusions, providing for a
more robust set of findings.
RESULTS
We begin with our first measure and describe the frequency of presidential congruence
across groups. Table 1 shows significant differences in policy congruence for both racial and
income groups despite a considerable amount of preference overlap between groups. Looking
first at the entire period, presidents acted in accordance with whites’ preferences 34% of the
time, but blacks’ preferences only 28% of the time, a difference significant at the .01 level (all
tests two-tailed; recall that by this measure presidents can propose more, less, or the same
amount of spending, so it is possible that presidential action ran counter to both groups’
preferences). Over the past four decades, presidents’ budget proposals have more often aligned
with whites’ preferences. Recall that we are examining all cases, including those in which
whites and blacks preferred the same action. In such cases, groups will be represented equally,
so including these cases attenuates the differences between groups. As we will see below, there
are conditions under which the racial gap is much larger. Table 1 also shows an income gap in
policy congruence of about the same size as the racial gap. Low income earners saw their
preferences mirrored in presidential proposals in 27% of cases, compared to 32% and 34% for
the middle and high income earners (p<.01).
The second column of Table 1 focuses on the cases in which groups preferred different
government action. Spending preferences are often similar across groups (Canon 1999; Soroka
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and Wlezien 2008). blacks and whites preferred different spending levels in 60 cases (22%).11
Low and middle income earners held different preferences in 39 instances (14%)12, while low
and high income earners preferred different proposals 49 times (18%).13 Since groups share the
same preferences most of the time, the extent of inequality of presidential representation, at least
in terms of budgetary proposals, will be somewhat limited.
Table 1 about here
However, when groups differ, meaning the president can act congruently with only one
group, budget proposals rarely reflect the preferences of African-Americans and the poor. When
blacks and whites preferred different action, presidential action aligned with whites’ preferences
47% of the time and blacks’ preferences only 18% of the time. Of the 39 cases where either
blacks or whites saw the president take their preferred action, whites got what they wanted 72%
of the time and blacks got what they wanted 28% of the time. When low and middle income
earners preferred different action, presidents’ proposals matched middle income earners’
preferences 20 times (51%), but just 5 times (13%) for low income earners. In the 49 instances
of conflict between low and high income earners, presidential behavior was congruent with high
income preferences 26 times (53%) compared to just 7 times (14%) for low income earners.
Looking over the whole period masks significant representation differences between the
parties. Columns 3 and 4 examine cases when a Democrat is in office and columns 5 and 6 focus
on Republican presidents. Democrats’ proposals reflected the preferences of blacks and whites
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The 60 cases occur in the following domains: welfare (19), space exploration (18), defense (10), parks
and recreation (7), roads (3), and big cities (3).
12

These 39 cases occur in the following domains: welfare (16), space exploration (16), defense (3), roads
(3), and big cities (1).
13

The 49 cases occur in the following domains: space exploration (21), welfare (16), defense (7), roads
(4), and big cities (1).
14

virtually identically. Across all 93 cases, Democrats’ proposals were congruent with blacks’
preferences 35% of the time and whites’ preferences 36% of the time, a statistically insignificant
difference. Even when whites and blacks preferred different action, Democrats’ proposals
reflected both groups’ preferences at about the same frequency. In fact, Democrats proposed
spending levels that matched African-American preferences somewhat more often (47%,
compared to 41% for whites), although the difference is not statistically significant.
In contrast, Republican proposals demonstrate significant racial inequality. Republican
proposals were consistent with whites’ preferences 33% of the time, but only 24% of the time for
blacks, (p<.01, see column 5). When forced to choose between matching blacks’ or whites’
preferences, Republicans’ proposed budgets matched whites’ preferences 47% of the time,
compared to just 9% of the time for blacks (see column 6).
We also see party differences in the representation of income groups. Democrats’
proposals treat all three income groups fairly equally. Across all cases, 31%, 34%, and 37% of
budget proposals are congruent with low, middle, and high income earners’ preferences,
respectively (see column 3). None of these differences are statistically significant (p = .13 for
the difference between low and high income earners, the comparison closest to significance).
There were few instances when Democrats had to choose between income groups (see column
4). When they did, their proposals were more often congruent with middle and high income
earners, but given the small case count, the differences are not statistically significant (p=.14 for
the low-high comparison).
In contrast, clear differences emerge in the representation of income groups during
Republican administrations. Across all cases, proposals were congruent with low, middle, and
high income preferences 24%, 31%, and 32% of the time, respectively (see column 5). The
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differences between the low income and the two other groups were significant at the .01 level.
Low income earners enjoyed even less congruence when their preferences conflicted with those
of the other groups (see column 6). In these cases, proposals were consistent with middle
income preferences 50% of the time and with low income preferences only 10% of the time.
When high and low income earners conflicted, the story was similar, with congruence in 49% of
cases for high income earners, but only in 11% of cases for low income earners. To sum up,
Republican presidents clearly advantage middle and high income earners across a broad set of
issues.14 We see a smaller advantage under Democrats, and there the differences are not
statistically significant. Finding significant income differences during Republican, but not
Democratic, presidencies parallels recent studies finding greater inequality in representation of
income groups by Republican members of Congress compared to Democrats in Congress
(Brunner, et al. 2013; Ellis 2013).

Robustness
Another approach is to take as the dependent variable a presidential proposal for
decreased spending (coded -1), about the same amount of spending (coded 0), and increased
spending (coded 1) and assess the extent to which preferences predict presidential proposals.15
This approach enables us to use either preference measure we discussed above, though we only
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We did conduct some additional analyses of each policy domain independently, but this type of analysis
slices the data too thinly to generate reliable conclusions.
15

The -1, 0, 1 coding is theoretically preferable to using the percentage change as the dependent variable.
It may seem initially that when a group scores high on the preference measure the president might
propose a big increase. However, a high score only indicates that many people want a spending increase,
not necessarily that the group prefers a large increase.
16

report results using the second measure (% of a group preferring more spending minus %
preferring less spending).16
Table 2 about here
Table 2 presents the ordered probit estimates. The model in column 1 estimates the
relationship between blacks’ spending preferences and the budget proposals of Democrats,
controlling for year and domain specific effects. The estimate is positive and statistically
significant at the .05 level. Column 2 shows that whites’ preferences are significantly related to
proposals as well. Figure 1(a) shows the predicted probability that the president will propose an
increase in spending across levels of group support for an increase. As more blacks prefer a
spending increase, the president is more likely to propose an increase. As support for a spending
boost increases among whites, the probability of a proposed increase rises at about the same rate.
When we include both preference measures in the same model (see Column 3), both the
coefficients are positive, but fall short of statistical significance, presumably due to collinearity
between the preference measures (recall that there are relatively few instances of preference
conflict under Democratic presidents).
The story is different during Republican presidencies. Column 4 shows that Republican
proposals are not related to blacks’ preferences, but Column 5 shows they are significantly
related to whites’ preferences. Figure 1(b) shows the substantive significance of these
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Results using either type of measure generate similar results. An advantage of this approach is that we
can control for unique patterns of presidential proposals for specific years and particular domains by
including indicator variables for each domain and each year. Although the year variables are jointly
statistically significant, models estimated without the year indicator variables generate similar results to
those reported below. For presentation purposes we omit the estimates for these indicator variables.
Canes-Wrone and Shotts (2004) show that for the mass public, policy congruence increases as elections
approach and when presidents are moderately popular. It is unclear how their model applies to subgroup
representation, so we do not incorporate these variables in the estimates we report (including them does
not significantly change the results).
17

differences. Even when blacks as a group overwhelmingly opposed spending increases, there
was about a .25 chance that a Republican president would propose an increase. At very high
levels of African-American support for a spending increase, the probability that the Republican
president will propose an increase only rises to around .40. In sharp contrast, Republicans are far
more likely to propose increased spending as support for higher spending increases among
whites. Including both blacks’ and whites’ preferences in the same model allows us to see that
whites tend to win the day when the two are in competition. As column 6 shows, controlling for
whites’ preferences, African-American preferences are unrelated to presidential proposals.
In contrast, controlling for blacks’ preferences, whites’ preferences remain strongly related to
Republican presidents’ proposals.
Figure 1 about here
Tables 3a and b presents parallel analyses for income. Columns 1-3 show that spending
preferences for all three income groups are significantly related to Democrats’ spending
proposals (see Table 3a). In fact, Figure 2 shows that presidents are essentially equally
responsive to the preferences of the three groups. The probability of a proposed spending
increase rises at the same rate across groups as support for an increase rises. Thus, we see no
evidence that Democrats treat any particular income group any differently than another. Results
are similar when we include two groups’ preferences in the same model (see columns 4-6). In
each case, the parameter estimates are positive, but not statistically significant, again due to a
relatively high degree of shared preferences.
Table 3 about here
Figure 2 about here
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Columns 1-3 in Table 3b show that Republicans’ proposals are more often congruent
with middle and high income earners. In fact, Republican proposals show no relationship with
the preferences of the lowest income group at all (see Column 1). In contrast, middle and high
income earners’ preferences are related to proposals (p<.10 for middle income earners, p<.05 for
high income earners). Including two of the three spending preference measures in the same
model (Columns 4-6) during Republican presidencies generates a negative and non-significant
low income estimate (Columns 4 and 5). The estimates are positive and significant for middle
income (p<.10) and high income earners (p<.01).
Figure 2(b) shows that Republicans are much more likely to call for spending increases
when high income earners as a group support such a move. This is much less true for low
income earners. Table 3b, column 6 even finds that when we account for shared preferences
between middle and high income earners, Republicans consistently match high income earners’
preferences, but are unrelated to middle income preferences. This evidence is consistent with
Gilens’ (2005, 2012; Gilens and Page 2014) finding that the wealthy tend to get significantly
more of what they want than even the middle class (see also Bartels 2008).

Discussion
To summarize, over the four decades of study, presidential proposals are less likely to
follow the preferences of blacks and the poor. This overall result is largely a consequence of the
Republican dominance of the White House during this period (Republicans held office in 22 of
38 years). Democrats’ budget proposals match the spending preferences of different groups
equally well, while Republicans’ proposals are clearly more aligned with the preferences of
whites and high income earners.
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This pattern of results is consistent with the notion that presidents simply do what their
party coalitions prefer. Studies of political representation frequently argue that re-election
minded representatives have incentives to be most responsive to their party coalition (e.g.,
Fiorina 1974; Wood 2009; see Clinton 2006 for evidence from Congress). Since party coalitions
differed in terms of race and income over this period, the results we observe may stem from
current party coalitions. Although we cannot parcel out exactly how much of the pattern of
results flows from each of these potential causes, we can examine whether the results are
consistent with the composition of party coalitions and the spending preferences of the groups
within these coalitions.
As noted above, the Democrats’ coalition includes a significant percentage of blacks and
is fairly balanced in terms of income, while there are very few African-American Republicans
and the Republican coalition includes many more high income earners than low income earners.
Thus the party coalitions will presumably push presidents toward the pattern of behavior we
observe. However, even among copartisans, Republican presidents propose policies that are
more frequently consistent with high income earners. As Table 4 shows, Republicans proposed
spending figures that were in line with low income earning Republicans 28% of the time,
compared to 32% for their middle income earning copartisans and 34% for high income
copartisans (differences between low income and other groups are significant at the .05 level).
In the 30 instances in which low income Republicans preferred different action than middle
income Republicans, Republican presidents were more likely to offer proposals in line with their
middle income copartisans, 33% compared to 10% (p<.05). The results are similar for the 36
instances of preference conflict between low and high income earning Republicans (42% to 14%,
p<.05). Democrats, on the other hand, represented their low, middle, and high income earning
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copartisans roughly equally. Democrats’ proposals were consistent with low income earners’
preferences 32% of the time compared to 34% of the time for middle and high income earning
Democrats, differences that fall short of statistical significance.
Table 4 about here
At least some of the difference between Republicans and Democrats on this count stems
from partisan differences in the preferences of income groups. Conflict between income groups
is fairly rare among Democrats, but more frequent among Republicans: high and low income
earning Democrats held different preferences for spending just 8 times during Democratic
administrations (9%), compared to 36 times for Republicans (20%). The relative similarity of
preferences among Democrats limits the possibility for unequal representation when Democrats
act consistent with their copartisans’ preferences. Republicans, on the other hand, more
frequently have to choose between acting as their low income copartisans prefer and the
preferences of their middle and high income copartisans.
In terms of race, when Democrats represent their copartisans, they usually act in ways
that blacks prefer. Democrats in the White House represent their African-American and white
copartisans more or less equally, as presidential proposals were consistent with their AfricanAmerican copartisans’ preferences 34% of the time and white copartisans’ preferences 35% of
the time, a non-statistically significant difference. In contrast, when Republicans act in ways that
correspond with their white copartisans’ preferences, they often act contrary to blacks’
preferences. During Republican administrations, there were 55 instances in which white
Republican copartisans held different preferences than blacks. Republican proposals reflected
white copartisan preferences 35% of the time and black copartisan preferences 9% of the time, a
difference significant at the .01 level.
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One final point deserves attention. When Republicans are in office, are blacks any worse
off than white Democrats? Interestingly, the answer is yes. Republicans do what white
Democrats prefer 29% of the time, largely because of some preference overlap between white
Democrats and Republicans. However, Republican presidents only act in concert with blacks’
preferences 24% of the time, a difference significant at the .05 level. Moreover, in the 33 cases
in which white Democrats and blacks preferred different action during a Republican
administration, the president’s proposal aligned with white Democrats’ preferences 33% of the
time and blacks’ preferences only 3% of the time (p<.01). In contrast, Democrats’ proposals
were equally aligned with white Democrats and blacks, matching up 35% and 34% of the time
respectively in general and 33% and 39% of the time respectively in the 18 instances of
preference conflict between these groups, a non-significant difference.17
In sum, the composition of party coalitions and the preference profiles of those coalitions
create incentives for Republicans to act in ways that advantage whites’ and high income earners’
preferences, but for Democrats to represent racial and income groups more or less equally. To
the extent that party coalitions shape the pattern of results we observe, we may well see changes
in who gets what they want from government as those coalitions change over time (or as
participation rates change across groups, effectively changing the parties’ electoral coalitions).
This account of presidents representing their core supporters, leading to income differences in
political representation as a consequence stands at some contradistinction to the accounts of
Bartels (2008) and Gilens (2012) in which the political system works in favor of the wealthy (see
also Brunner, Ross, and Washington 2013; Ellis 2013).

17

The party differences reflect the preferences of these two groups. In the 49 instances when white
Democrats and blacks prefer different things, white Democrats’ preferences match Republicans’
preferences 45 times (92%).
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CONCLUSION
The evidence we present points to disparities in presidential representation based on race
and income. When Republicans are in office, blacks and low income earners are at a clear
disadvantage. When whites and high income earners conflict with blacks and low income
earners, whites and high income earners see their preferences translated into presidential
behavior about five times as often as blacks and low income earners. However, when Democrats
occupy the Oval Office, these groups’ views are much more equally represented in presidents’
budget proposals. Over the last four decades, this pattern has generated unequal representation
because Republicans held office more frequently.
As we noted above, there are many ways to conceptualize and measure presidential
representation (Conley 2005). We have adopted one strategy, but future research should employ
alternatives. We assess the links between preferences and outputs at a given time. A dynamic
study of representation may yield a different pattern of results since different groups tend to
respond to events similarly (e.g., Kelly and Enns 2010; Soroka and Wlezien 2011). Examining
the links between various measures of public preferences and various types of presidential
behavior will deepen our understanding of presidential responsiveness. For example, Druckman
and Jacobs (2011) plumb the riches of Ronald Reagan’s personal polling data to see with great
detail the kinds of information the president and his advisors collected and used in making
decisions. Because we know presidents and their staffs purposely collected and analyzed these
kinds of data we can get much closer to identifying the causal impact of groups’ preferences. In
addition, Gilens (2012) found that income-based inequalities were most muted in social welfare
domains, which made up many of the domains we examined. Thus, inequalities we uncovered
may be greater in other domains.
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For now, what should we make of our findings? First, we note that there is a fair amount
of agreement between the groups’ spending preferences. Recall that blacks and whites held the
same preferences in 78% of cases (see also Canon 1999). Low and middle income earners
shared preferences 86% of the time, while low and high income earners preferred the same
spending direction 82% of the time. When groups hold the same preferences, presidents cannot
represent groups unequally, so these similar preferences provide a natural limit to the extent of
unequal representation (Soroka and Wlezien 2008). However, when groups prefer different
action, the preferences of blacks and low income earners are typically underrepresented by
Republicans.
Presidential representation may be more lopsided in domains with more race- and
income-based preference conflict. For example, preferences for race related policies (e.g.,
affirmative action) often exhibit greater race-based differences than the spending preferences we
examined (Kinder and Winter 2001). Although we might expect to see greater disparities in
representation in such domains, it is important to note that in one of the main tasks of
government—allocating taxpayer money—there is a high degree of agreement across groups and
consequently, a somewhat limited degree of unequal representation.
In terms of racial inequalities, one’s normative response to our analysis likely depends on
one’s notion of what political equality looks like in the context of minority groups (see Griffin
and Newman 2008, ch. 2). If one expects groups to get what they want with the same frequency,
the results show that Democrats are achieving political equality, but Republican presidents are
not. Others might not expect blacks, who made up 10 to 15 percent of the public during the
period of study, to see their preferences enacted as often as whites. From a proportionality
perspective, relatively infrequent congruence for blacks during Republican administrations may
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not be terribly troubling. After all, even when blacks and whites disagree, Republican presidents
proposed spending policies congruent with blacks’ preferences 9% of the time, a figure not too
far from the percentage of the public comprised of blacks and larger than the percentage of the
Republican coalition made up of blacks.
Concerns about significant income differences in presidential representation are likely to
be more uniform. Since the income groups were defined to be roughly equal in size, any
evidence of inequality across groups would violate notions of both strict equality and
proportionality. When Republicans are in office, the income results presented above point to a
real violation of political equality. Since high income earners already occupy an advantaged
position, many will find it unsettling that Republican budget proposals better reflect this group’s
preferences than the preferences of low income earners. These results help to elucidate a
pathway by which Republican presidents have presided over increases in this country’s income
inequality (Bartels 2008). One of the reasons that the rich get richer during Republican
presidencies may be Republicans’ pursuit of spending priorities that are most consistent with
high income earners’ preferences.
Whether or not readers find our results at odds with their vision of political equality,
when viewed through the lens of party coalitions, many will find it hard to blame either
Democrats or Republicans for behavior that generally matches the views of those that comprise
their party coalitions. Observers may want different outcomes, but current political conditions
strongly push toward the findings we present.
Finding inequality in presidential representation, even if its scope is circumscribed by
some shared preferences among groups, is important for American democracy. The evidence
that whites and those with greater monetary resources tend to be better represented in Congress
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is mounting (e.g., Jacobs and Page 2005; Bartels 2008; Griffin and Newman 2008; Ellis 2012;
Gilens and Page 2014). In the checks and balances system of American government, the
president can theoretically ameliorate these inequalities. Our results suggest that Democrats in
the White House may be doing this, but Republicans are not.
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Appendix
In matching spending items to budget “functions”, we followed Canes-Wrone and Shotts
(2004) and Wlezien (2004). Table A1 details the specific matches between GSS items and
budgetary figures. Table A2 compares the percentage of cases with congruence we found in
each domain using Canes-Wrone and Shotts’ measure to those reported by Canes-Wrone and
Shotts (2004, 692). The vectors of percentages correlate at .96.

GSS Item
Defense

TABLE A1: MATCHING GSS ITEMS TO BUDGET FUNCTIONS
Budget function
Years
Defense (total)
All GSS years (1974-1978,
1980, 1982-1991, 1993, 1994,
1996, 1998, 2000, 2002,
2004, 2006, 2008, 2010)

Foreign Aid

International affairs (151+152)
International Development and
Humanitarian assistance +
International Security Assistance)

All GSS years

Space

Space (253+254+255)

All GSS years

Environment

Environment (301+302+304+306)

All GSS years

National Parks

Recreational resources (303)

1984-1991, 1993, 1994, 1996,
1998, 2000, 2002, 2004,
2006, 2008, 2010

Ground
Transportation

Ground Transportation (401)

1984-1991, 1993, 1994, 1996,
1998, 2000, 2002, 2004,
2006, 2008, 2010

Cities

Community and Regional
Development (451+452)

All GSS years

Education

Education (501+502+503)

All GSS years

Health

Health (550)

All GSS years

Welfare

Income Security (604+605+609)

All GSS years

Crime

Administration of Justice (750)

All GSS years
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TABLE A2: POLICY CONGRUENCE BY ISSUE, CANES-WRONE AND SHOTTS
AND OUR ANALYSES
Issue
Crime
Defense
Education
Environment
Foreign Aid
Ground Transportation
Health Care
National Parks
Space
Welfare

% Congruence
Canes-Wrone and Shotts
92
32
57
41
32
33
92
15
9
50

28

% Congruence
Our Analysis
88
35
60
52
21
33
88
33
8
50
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TABLE 1: PERCENTAGE OF CASES WITH CONGRUENCE, BY RACE AND INCOME

Blacks
Whites
Difference
N
Low Income
Middle Income
Difference
N

All Presidents
All Cases
Conflicting
Preferences
28%
18%
34
47
6**
28**
270
60

Democratic Presidents
All Cases
Conflicting
Preferences
35%
47%
36
41
1
6
93
17

Republican Presidents
All Cases
Conflicting
Preferences
24%
9%
33
47
9**
37**
177
43

27
32
6**
270

13
51
38**
39

31
34
3
93

22
56
33
9

24
31
7**
177

10
50
40**
30

Low Income
27
High Income
34
Difference
7**
N
270
*
denotes p<.05; ** p<.01.

14
53
39**
49

31
37
6
93

25
67
42
12

24
32
8**
177

11
49
38**
37
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TABLE 2: REPRESENTATION OF RACIAL GROUP PREFERENCES BY PRESIDENTIAL PARTY

Blacks’ Preferences
Whites’ Preferences

Cut Point 1
Cut Point 2

Democratic Presidents
(1)
(2)
(3)
3.65**
2.49
(1.40)
(1.76)
3.60*
2.06
(1.42)
(1.82)

Republican Presidents
(4)
(5)
(6)
0.63
-1.33
(1.16)
(1.45)
2.82*
3.61*
(1.23)
(1.50)

2.36
(1.00)
3.15
(3.15)

0.97
(0.87)
1.56
(0.88)

1.71
(0.82)
2.51
(0.83)

2.52
(1.03)
3.33
(1.05)

2.04
(0.81)
2.64
(0.82)

1.63
(0.93)
2.23
(0.93)

% Correctly predicted,
38
38
38
46
46
46
modal category
% Correctly predicted
54
58
42
61
62
63
by model
% Reduction of error
26
33
6
27
30
31
over mode
N
93
93
93
177
177
177
Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Preferences are defined as the
percentage of a group preferring more spending minus the percentage of a group preferring less spending.
Models estimated via ordered probit and include dummy variables for years and issue domains. Percent
reduction of error calculated as % correctly predicted by the model minus the % correctly predicted by the
modal category of the dependent variable, divided by 100 minus the % correctly predicted by the modal
value (Hagle and Mitchell 1992).
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TABLE 3(A): REPRESENTATION OF INCOME GROUP PREFERENCE, DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTS
(1)
3.92*
(1.61)

Low Income Preferences

(2)

Middle Income Preferences

(3)

3.11*
(1.29)

High Income Preferences

(4)
2.51
(3.08)
1.35
(2.52)

3.27*
(1.32)

Cut Point 1
Cut Point 2

% Correctly predicted,
Modal
% Correctly predicted,
Model
% reduction of error
over mode
N

(5)
1.96
(2.61)

(6)

2.02
(2.13)

0.71
(3.01)
2.63
(3.00)

1.89
(0.89)
2.68
(0.90)

1.66
(0.82)
2.44
(0.83)

1.56
(0.78)
2.34
(0.79)

1.91
(0.89)
2.70
(0.90)

1.88
(0.90)
2.67
(0.91)

1.63
(0.83)
2.42
(0.84)

38

38

38

38

38

38

51

57

55

54

56

57

21

31

28

26

29

31

93

93

93

93

93

93

TABLE 3(B): REPRESENTATION OF INCOME GROUP PREFERENCE, REPUBLICAN PRESIDENTS

Low Income Preferences

(1)
1.13
(1.24)

Middle Income Preferences

(2)

2.24
(1.23)+

High Income Preferences

Cut Point 1
Cut Point 2

% Correctly predicted,
Modal
% Correctly predicted,
Model
% reduction of error
over mode

(3)

1.14
(0.79)
1.72
(0.79)*

1.83
(0.85)*
2.42
(0.85)**

2.88
(1.11)**
(1.11)**
2.10
(0.77)**
2.70
(0.78)**

(4)
-1.66
(1.99)
3.51
(1.96)+

1.73
(0.85)*
2.32
(0.86)**

(5)
-1.82
(1.66)

(6)

3.94
(1.48)**

-1.53
(2.27)
4.03
(2.04)*

1.77
(0.82)*
2.37
(0.83)**

1.86
(0.85)*
2.46
(0.85)**

46

46

46

46

46

46

60

62

63

61

64

63

26

30

31

28

33

31

N
177
177
177
177
177
Standard errors in parentheses; + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Models estimated via ordered probit and include dummy variables for years and issue domains.
See Table 2 for calculation of percent reduction of error.
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TABLE 4: PARTY DIFFERENCES IN REPRESENTING COPARTISANS

Low Income
Middle Income
Difference
N
Low Income
High Income
Difference
N

Democratic Presidents
% All
% of Conflicting
cases
Preferences Cases
32
33
34
67
2
33
93
6
32
34
2
93

25
50
25
8

*p<.05
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Republican Presidents
% of All
% of Conflicting
Cases Preferences Cases
28
10
32
33
4*
23*
177
30
28
34
6*
177

14
42
28*
36

Probability of a Proposed Spending Increase

1

FIGURE 1(A): DEMOCRATS' RESPONSIVENESS TO AFRICAN-AMERICAN
AND WHITE OPINION
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FIGURE 1(B): REPUBLICANS' RESPONSIVENESS TO AFRICANAMERICAN AND WHITE OPINION
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FIGURE 2(A): DEMOCRATS' RESPONSIVENESS TO INCOME GROUPS
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FIGURE 2(B): REPUBLICANS' RESPONSIVENESS TO INCOME GROUPS
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